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LAW OF ZONING IN MISSOURI
THE LAW OF ZONING IN MISSOURI SINCE
EUCLID V. AMBLER REALTY CO.
J. B. STEINERt
It has long been the law that one must use his property in such
a manner as not to injure the property of his neighbor.1 A viola-
tion of this rule constitutes a nuisance.2 It has been judicially
stated that "any business establishment is likely to be a genuine
nuisance in a neighborhood of residences,"3 and that "a nuisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard."'' Thus, almost any business, not
a nuisance per se, may become a nuisance when it is out of place.
Courts of equity afford a remedy in such an instance.5
A lawful business or use may offend another, however, with-
out rising or sinking to the level of nuisance. Accordingly, in-
junction cannot reach all or even a considerable percentage of
offenses by property-indeed none, unless they are nuisances.
Paradoxically, the equitable remedy is inadequate. In conse-
t LL.B., University of Missouri, 1912. Member of the St. Louis bar.
Former Associate City Counselor of the City of St. Louis, Condemnation
Division. The writer wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Adolph
Hoenny, also of the St. Louis bar, in the preparation of this article.
1. Mugler v. Kansas (1887) 123 U. S. 623, 660; Munn v. Illinois (1876)
94 U. S. 113, 114. In Bellerive Investment Co. v. Kansas City (1929) 321
Mo. 969, 13 S. W. (2d) 628, 640, the Supreme Court of Missouri said:
"Ordinarily, the citizen has the right to use that which is his own, in such
a manner as he pleases, but if the use thereof seriously affects the general
public, society and the laws thereof demand a surrender of a part of the
individual rights for the general welfare of the public, for such is the basis
of all government"
2. From the French nuire, to injure, hurt, or harm.
3. State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans (1923) 154 La. 271, 283, 97 So.
440, 444.
4. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926) 272 U. S. 365, 388, per Suther-
land, J.
5. Rhodes v. A. Moll Grocer Company (Mo. App. 1936) 95 S. W. (2d)
837, 841; George v. Goodovich (1927) 288 Pa. 48, 135 Atl. 719 (enjoining
erection of ten-car garage in residential district); Tureman v. Ketterlin
(1924) 304 Mo. 221, 263 S. W. 202 (holding an undertaking establishment
a private nuisance); Ross v. Butler (1868) 19 N. J. Eq. 294, 97 Am. Dec.
654, 657. In Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Company (1928) 4
S. W. (2d) 776, certain property owners sought to enjoin the construction
of an ice plant in their residential neighborhood. The court held such a
plant not to be a nuisance per se, and the injunction was not allowed. An
ice plant may be excluded, however, from a residence district by a zoning
ordinance. See note 43, infra, and text supported thereby.
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quence, an ancient legal concept,6 the police power, has been in-
voked. That power deals with classes; and zoning is essentially
a classification of uses. Zoning may not have had its origin in
this way, but the suggestion is persuasive. Mr. Justice Suther-
land has observed that the question, whether or not the power
exists "to forbid the erection of a building of a particular kind
or for a particular use, like the question whether a particular
thing is a nuisance, '"7 is to be determined, not in an abstract
manner, but by considering the particular thing or use with other
things and uses in the same locality. Concretely, residential build-
ings should be built with other residential buildings in an area
-naturally suited to such uses, with a view to holding that area
-as a residential district; and so with other uses.
Zoning seeks by fixed rule of law to prescribe how real prop-
erty shall be used. Technically, it is a limitation on the use of
private property. Uses or zones fall quite naturally into such
classifications as residential, multiple dwelling, business, indus-
trial, et cetera. Perfect classifications are not humanly possible;
therefore, legal questions arise. If industrial property worth two
dollars per square foot were zoned as residential property, great
injustice would be done; that would amount to depriving the
owner of his property without compensation. If a tract of land
is industrial, made so by its proximity to a railroad, it would
be arbitrary to zone it as residential property. However, should
the railroad be removed, the same tract of land might become
residential property by reason of the changed conditions. This
improbable supposition is given to illustrate how necessary it
may be to change the zoning restrictions.
Use and adaptability must be considered in so far as possible
in zoning. They are taken into consideration in the valuation of
private property when it is taken for public use in the exercise
of the right of eminent domain.8 If use and adaptability are not
6. Ancient, though not recognized as such until the last century. See
Tiedeman, Limitations of Police Power in the United States (1886) sec. 96a.
7. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926) 272 U. S. 365, 388.
8. Boom Company v. Patterson (1878) 98 U. S. 403, 407, 408, followed
in St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States (1929) 279 U. S. 461, 503, as
to use and adaptability; Yonts v. Public Service Co. (1929) 179 Ark. 695,
17 S. W. (2d) 886; Illinois Light & Power Co. v. Bedard (1931) 343 Ill.
618, 175 N. E. 851, 852; Joint Highway Dist. No. 9 v. Ocean Shore R. R.(1933) 128 Cal. App. 743, 18 P. (2d) 413. In Dowsey v. Village of Kensing-
ton (1931) 257 N. Y. 221, 177 N. E. 427, 430, the New York Court of
Appeals said: "Certainly an ordinance is unreasonable which restricts prop-
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thus looked to, it will often become necessary to amend the zon-
ing ordinance from time to time; or the ordinance may be sub-
jected to damaging tests in the courts.
Zoning extends to all property in a municipality. Its objectives
-could conceivably be obtained by exercise of the power of eminent
*domain, but such a procedure would be impractical9 if not vir-
tually impossible. If zoning is to be established by the police
power, however, certain fundamental considerations cannot be
overlooked. Municipalities must have authority from the state
,constitution or by legislative grant to pass such ordinances.10 If
the ordinance is a reasonable exercise of the police power, prop-
erty damage incidental thereto does not condemn it as offensive
to the compensation requirements of the constitution. If, how-
ever, the ordinance does not come within a reasonable exercise
of the police power, it is void and should be so declared by the
-courts. Such an ordinance amounts to the taking of property
without due process of law, prohibited by the Federal11 and
state" constitutions. Further, private property cannot be con-
stitutionally taken without just compensation. 8 Expressed in
-nother way, private property cannot be taken by legislative
fiat.' It is for these reasons that zoning ordinances do not and
must not disturb uses existing at the time of the effective date of
said ordinances. Thus, where an attempt was made to establish
building lines on a boulevard, forty feet distant from and parallel
with the north and south lines of said street, under the police
erty upon the boundary of the village to a use for which the property is
not adapted, and thereby destroys the greater part of its value in order that
the beauty of the village as a whole may be enhanced. * * * The restriction
itself constitutes an invasion of his property rights." There the parcel in
question was on a highway, and, therefore, better suited to and more valu-
able for business and apartment house uses.
9. State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher (1927) 317 Mo. 1179,
298 S. W. 720, 724.
10. See, e. g., R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 7259-7270. The Enabling Acts of
ill states are substantially the same. See notes 20, 48, and 70, infra.
11. "1 * * * Nor shall any state deprive any person of property without
-due process of law, * * *." U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, see. 1.
12. "That no person shall be deprived of property without due process
-of law." Mo. Const. art. II, sec. 30.
13. "That private property shall not be taken for public use withoutjust compensation." Mo. Const. art. II, sec. 21. The constitutional provi-
sions of all states with respect to due process of law and just compensa-
tion are the same in substance.
14. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1928) 272 U. S. 365, 389, where the
court held that it could not be said that the ordinance being considered
-passed the bounds of reason and assumed "the character of a merely arbi-
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power, there being no provision in either the enabling act15 or
the ordinance of the city authorizing the condemnation of a build-
ing line or compensation therefor, both the statute and the ordi-
nance were held to violate the state constitution."" In addition
to the taking of property without compensation, no notice to the
owners was there provided; hence, according to the court, the
owners were deprived of their property without due process of
law. Since the statute and ordinance did not come within the
police power, the property was taken by legislative fiat. As soon
as the ordinance became effective, there was a taking of property
without compensation, which taking in this instance lasted until
the ordinance was declared invalid. In a later case 7 where the
ordinance provided that the houses fronting on a portion of a
named avenue "shall be used for residences only, and no business
avocation whatever shall be allowed to be followed in the same,"
the court again held the restrictive use invalid and "that the use
of property is property itself."
In 1924, Roanoke, Virginia, amended its general zoning ordi-
nance to establish a "building line, with relation to the street, to
which all buildings subsequently erected must conform." A
proviso to this ordinance reserved to the city council "the author-
ity to make exceptions and permit the erection of buildings closer
to the street." Petitioner sought to test the validity of the build-
ing line'provisions by asking for mandamus to compel the council
to issue a permit to occupy his lot up to the street line. The
Supreme Court, pointing out that the reservation to the city
council to make exceptions and to permit the erection of build-
ings closer to the street might avoid hardship, said:
We think it entirely plain that the reservation of authority
in the present ordinance to deal in a special manner with
such exceptional cases is unassailable upon constitutional
grounds.28
trary fiat," although "some industries of an innocent character might fall
within the prescribed class." See also Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch (1912)
226 U. S. 192, 204; Lowry v. Rainwater (1879) 70 Mo. 152, 159; Board
of Education v. Bakewell (1887) 22 Ill. 339, 10 N. E. 378, 382; Culbertsoir
v. Coleman (1879) 47 Wis. 193, 2 N. W. 124.
15. Mo. Laws of 1891, 47. The act provided that cities of Missourf
having a population of 3,000 inhabitants or more "may establish building
lines to which all buildings and structures thereon shall conform."
16. St. Louis v. Hill (1893) 116 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861, 863.
17. St. Louis v. Dorr (1898) 145 Mo. 466, 41 S. W. 1094, 1099, 46 S. W.
976, 981. The Enabling Act was here again Mo. Laws of 1891, 47.
18. Gorieb v. Fox (1927) 274 U. S. 603, 607. As to the proper method'
of amending zoning ordinances see notes 45, 46, 47, 48, and 70, and text-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss2/3
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Probably the most significant contention in this case, however,
was that the building line provision was invalid in that it de-
prived the petitioner of his property without due process of law.
The court, however, refused to characterize the ordinance under
review as clearly arbitrary and unreasonable without substan-
tial relation to the police power.
This seems to be the only case involving a building line estab-
lished by an exercise of the police power. However, zoning laws
that provide for open spaces in front of private property along
streets reach the same result. In Kansas City v. Liebi19 a build-
ing line, thirty-five feet from either side of a boulevard, was
established by eminent domain. Compensation was paid for prop-
erty damaged, and, therefore, the question of due process of law
did not arise.
The ordinance involved in St. Louis v. Dreisoeemei2 o went a step
further than was attempted in the Hill 21 and Dori2 2 cases. It
prohibited the operation of certain business and manufacturing
Wlants within six hundred feet of Tower Grove Park in St. Louis.
As a police regulation, the ordinance was held to be unreasonable
on its face, and, as applied to the calling of defendant (wood
manufacturing), to deprive him of the full uses of his property
supported by said notes. The proviso in the amending ordinance was also
attacked on the ground that it violated the equal protection of the law in
that it enabled the city council unfairly to discriminate between lot owners
by fixing unequal distances from the street for the erection of buildings
of the same character under like circumstances. The court said: "We can-
not, of course, construe the ordinance as meaning that the power may be
thus exerted; nor may we assume in advance that it will be exercised by
the council capriciously, arbitrarily, or with inequality." Id. at 607.
19. (1923) 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404, 407. The proceedings were at-
tacked on the ground that a building line was not a public use. The court
in sustaining the project held that "public use" is synonymous with "public
benefit" or "public advantage." Nichols, Eminent Domain (2d ed. 1917)
secs. 130, 131.
20. (1912) 243 Mo. 217, 147 S. W. 998, 1000. The fact that there was
no enabling act, authorizing the ordinance, constituted one of the grounds,
for the decision. In Wippler v. Hohn (1937) 110 S. W. (2d) 409, 411,
Judge Gantt in speaking for the court said: "Zoning is not of purely,
municipal concern. It operates locally but is governmental and referable
to the police power." That power came from the enabling act. That a
municipality has no inherent power and that its powers must come from the
o4nstitution or by legislative grant, see Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing
Machine Co. (1985) 337 Mo. 913, 87 S. W. (2d) 195; 1 McQuillin, Munici-
pal Corpomtione (2d ed. 1928) 416, sec. 145.
21. (1893) 116 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861, 863, cited supra, note 16.
22. (1898) 145 Mo. 466, 41 S. W. 1094, 1099, 46 S. W. 976, 981, cited
aupra, note 17.
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without compensation and due process of law. The police power
was said to extend only to public safety, health, morals, and
public welfare, not to aesthetic purposes.
Closely related to zoning are the billboard cases. It was held
in St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis23 that the regula-
tion of billboards, that is, confining them to certain heights, sizes,
and positions along the streets, was a reasonable exercise of the
police power. In affirming that case, the Supreme Court of the
United States declared that billboards may be put in a class by
themselves and prohibited in the residence districts of the city
in the interest of the safety, morality, health, and decency of the
community.24
The removal of billboards from residential districts is in effect
a zonfng regulation, although the basic legal reason assigned for
the removal has been the prevention of crime.25 Mr. Justice
Holmes pointed out that the requirement of conformity to the
building line had aesthetic considerations in view more than any-
thing else; but as the main burdens of the ordinance professedly
stood on other grounds, the Court refused to declare the ordi-
nance void on account of any furtherance of aesthetic considera-
tions,26 which were dubbed as merely incidental to the safety,
morality, and decency of the community.
In 1918, St. Louis passed its first general zoning ordinance,
in which the city was divided into districts or uses, to-wit: (1)
residence; (2) second residence; (3) commercial; (4) indus-
trial; (5) unrestricted. The test of this ordinance came in State
ex rel. Penrose Investment Co. v. McKelvey,27 when the relator
sought a permit to erect an ice plant in the second residence
district. The court held that the ordinance imposed restrictions
on the lawful uses of private property without due process. On
the same day the Penrose case was handed down, the Supreme
Court of Missouri also decided the case of St. Louis v. Evraiff2 8
which grew out of the same ordinance. The defendant was con-
23. (1917) 195 S. W. 717.
24. (1919) 249 U. S. 269.
25. St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. St. Louis (1911) 235 Mo. 99,
137 S. W. 929; Thomas Cusack Company v. Chicago (1917) 242 U. S. 526,
aff'g (1915) 267 IlI. 344, 108 N. E. 340.
26. St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis (1919) 249 U. S. 269,
274.
27. (1923) 301 Mo. 1, 256 S. W. 474.
28. (1923) 301 Mo. 231, 256 S. W. 489.
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ducting a rag and junk yard in a section of St. Louis zoned as
industrial. For this violation the city sued to recover penalties.
The court held that the ordinance imposed restrictions upon the
uses of private property that had no relation to the police power.
Judge Graves, in a separate opinion in the McKelvey case, said:
The value of property is dependent upon the uses to which
it may be put. To limit the use is a restriction upon the
right of property and should not be made without compen-
sation, unless the right restricted would, if exercised, rise
to the plane of a public nuisance.2
According to this pronouncement, only nuisances come within
the scope of zoning. Of course such a statement bears no rela-
tion to zoning laws as we know them today. It completely over-
looks the fact that zoning may be legal in its general scope and
yet be objectionable in particular instances where the ordinance
applies in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, as the later
decisions indicate.
Not long after the McKelvey decision the question of the legal-
ity of zoning reached the Supreme Court of the United States
in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company.30 Prior to that time the
courts in a number of states had rejected zoning, but those of a
greater number had approved it.31 Under the Euclid ordinance
the village was divided into classes or use districts: U-i, single
family dwellings; U-2, two-family dwellings; U-3, apartments,
flats, schools, hospitals; U-4, retail and wholesale business; U-5,
billboards, warehouses, markets, and light manufacturing; U-6,
heavy manufacturing and business in the nature of nuisances.
In this ordinance there were four area districts and three height
districts . 2 The appellee's land, bounded on the north by the
Nickel Plate Railroad, on the south by Euclid Avenue, had an
29. 265 S. W. at 478. See, also, State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Chris-
topher (1927) 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S. W. 720, 727.
30. (1926) 272 U. S. 365.
31. See discussion in Bassett, Zoning (193&) 47. "The Law of Zoning in
Missouri," as of the date of its publication (May, 1926) was competently
treated in an article by Frederick V. Wells in 34 U. of Mo. Bull. L. Ser. 3.
At the time of the appearance of the article, the Euclid case was yet in the
Ohio state courts. The significant changes wrought by that case merit the
further discussion of Mr. Wells' subject.
32. A statute limiting buildings to a certain height in one part of the
city of Boston and to another height in another part of the city was valid
as a police measure in Welch v. Swasey (1909) 214 U. S. 91, aff'g (1907)
193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745. Height and character of construction come
within the safety measures of the police power.
1939]
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area of sixty-eight acres. Adjoining this tract on both the east
and west were residential districts. The southern six hundred
feet was zoned as class U-2 use; the next one hundred thirty feet
as U-3; and the remainder of the tract fell in class U-6 use, the
latter being that portion nearest to the railroad.
In the Ambler case, the court pointed out early that a thing
not a nuisance in itself may become one by improper location,
and that "offensive trades, industries and structures likely to
create nuisances""8 may be excluded from residential areas with-
out legal difficulty. The fact that certain ihdustries, neither of-
fensive nor dangerous, were prohibited by the ordinance, as were
those which were offensive and dangerous, did not militate
against the zoning ordinance,,, The law is not condemned be-
33. In Reinman v. Little Rock (1915) 237 U. S. 171, the Court had held
an ordinance, prohibiting livery stables within an area including the de-
fendant's stables, was a valid exercise of the police power; that the ordi-
nance did not deprive the defendants of their property without due process
of law, nor deny them equal protection of the law, even though the de-
fendants had been at great expense for many years in constructing build-
ings with a view to making the stables sanitary. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian
(1915) 239 U. S. 294, an ordinance which prohibited brickmaking in a
designated area of the city where the plant and tract in question were
worth several thousand dollars, was held valid as a police regulation, oper-
ating alike upon all who came within its terms; "no person has a vested
right in any general rule of law or policy of legislation entitling him to
insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit." The ordinance did
not, however, prohibit the removal of the fine clay. In West Bros. Brick
Co. v. Alexander (Va. 1937) 192 S. E. 881, 885, an eighteen acre tract of
clay land was located near residences and business houses. An ordinance
prohibiting the owner of the claybeds from beginning excavations was held
valid under the police power. In Ex parte Davison (Mo. 1928) 13 S. W.(2d) 40, an ordinance, which prohibited the opening and operation of a
stone quarry within 300 feet of an inhabitable building, not being a nui-
sance per se, was held invalid. On the question of taking property under
the police power, the Court, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co.
v. State of Illinois ex rel. Drainage Commissioners (1906) 200 U. S. 561,
594, said: "Uncompensated obedience to a regulation enacted for the public
safety under the police power of the state is not taking property without
compensation. * * * But the clause prohibiting the taking of private prop-
erty without compensation is not intended as a limitation of the exercise
of those police powers which are necessary to the tranquillity of every well-
ordered community, nor of that general power over private property which
is necessary for the orderly existence of all governments."
34. In Hebe Company v. Shaw (1919) 248 U. S. 297, the Court said:
"The power of legislation is not to be denied simply because some innocent
articles or transactions may be found within the prescribed class." In
Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope (1919) 248 U. S. 498, the ordinance forbade the
storing of petroleum and gasoline within three hundred feet of any dwelling
house. A bulk station located on the right-of-way of the railroad, having
been moved there at the request of the city, came under the zoning law
ban. Held, that a state may make the place where dangerous oils are kept
a criminal nuisance, notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss2/3
LAW OF ZONING IN MISSOURI
cause "the bad fades into the good by such degrees that the two
are not capable of being readily distinguished."
The crucial question was whether or not the zoning ordinance
could exclude from residential districts apartment houses, retail
stores and shops, and like establishments. Before deciding this
question, the court quoted approvingly from Aurora v. Burns35
and from State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans,6 both of which
had sustained the legality of comprehensive zoning ordinances.
In the Aurora case it was pointed out that with the increasing
complexity of industrial activities, the police power must neces-
sarily develop within reasonable bounds to meet changing condi-
tions; that the segregation of industries, commercial pursuits,
and dwelling houses to their particular districts bear a rational
relation to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the
community for the reason that the establishment of zones may
prevent congestion of the population, minimize risk of contagion,
secure quiet residence districts, expedite transportation, enforce
traffic regulations, suppress disorder, and lessen fire hazards. In
the New Orleans case the court observed that the exclusion of
business and commercial activities from the residence districts
has a substantial relation to the police power in that segregation
affords better police protection; lessens crime in the residence
sections by removing open shops which invite loiterers and
idlers; saves paving costs by confining heavy truck hauling to
commercial streets; facilitates quiet and tends to prevent dis-
turbances; keeps away the malodorous, as well as the unsightly,
thereby tending to keep away rats, mice, roaches, flies, ants, et
,cetera from the residence districts; and enhances the safety and
security of home life.37
For the reasons thus summarized the Court found itself unable
to hold the zoning ordinance unconstitutional as arbitrary and
unreasonable or as having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare:
The court will not scrutinize its provisions, sentence by
sentence, to ascertain by a process of piecemeal dissection
whether there may be, here and there, provisions of a minor
character, or relating to matters of administration, or not
35. (1925) 319 Ill. 84, 98-95, 149 N. E. 784, 788.
36. (1928) 154 La. 271, 282, 283, 97 So. 440, 444.
37. (1926) 272 U. S. 365; cf. Ryan v. Warrensburg (1938) 117 S. W.(2d) 303.
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shown to contribute to the injury complained of, which, if
attacked separately, might not withstand the test of consti-
tutionality.3 8
It is enough for us to determine, as we do, that the ordi-
nance in its general scope and dominant features, so far as
its provisions are here involved, is a valid exercise of author-
ity, leaving other provisions to be dealt with as cases arise
directly involving them.39
Very decisively, this decision settled the question of the legality
of zoning in the United States.40
About a year after the opinion in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
was handed down, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided State
ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher,41 which upheld the St.
Louis zoning ordinance.42 The relator sought by proceedings in
38. 272 U. S. at 395.
39. 272 U. S. at 397.
40. See Bassett, Zoning (1936) 47. The court cited but did not discuss
Lincoln Trust Company v. Williams Building Corporation (1920) 229 N. Y.
313, 128 N. E. 209, which held valid a New York resolution, creating three
districts: residential, business, and unrestricted, as a police measure; also
Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381, where the
court held that the establishment of strictly private residence districts, as a.
part of the comprehensive zoning plan, was for the general welfare of the
community because it tended to promote and perpetuate the American home.
Since the decision in the Ambler case the Supreme Court has held the zoning
ordinance of the city of Los Angeles constitutional in its general scope.
Zahn v. Board of Public Works (1927) 274 U. S. 325, aff'g 195 Cal. 497,
234 P. 388. In Nectow v. Cambridge (1928) 277 U. S. 183, it was conceded
that the zoning ordinance was valid in its general scope.
41. (1927) 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S. W. 720, 725.
42. St. Louis Code (1926) sees. 152-176. The pertinent sections are as
follows: "Sec. 2. In order to regulate and restrict the location, erection,
alteration or use of buildings, structures or land, the City of St. Louis is
hereby divided into five (5) Use Districts, known as: 1. Residence. 2. Mul-
tiple Dwelling District. 3. Commercial District. 4. Industrial District. 5.
Unrestricted District.
"Sec. 3. In the residence district no buildings or premises shall be used
and no building therein shall be erected or structurally altered except for
the following purposes: 1. One Family Dwelling. 2. Two Family Dwelling.
3. Church. 4. Schools offering instruction in primary, secondary or col-
legiate courses of study. 5. Library, museum, playground, park or recrea-
tional buildings which are owned or operated by the municipality. 6. Ac-
cessory buildings, including one private garage or private stable when
located not less than thirty (30) feet from the front lot line and not less
than five (5) feet from any side street line, or a private garage constructed
as a part of the main building * * *
"Sec. 4. In the multiple dwelling district no building or premises shall
be used and no building therein shall be erected or structurally altered ex-
cept for the following purposes: 1. Any use permitted in the residence Dis-
trict. 2. Multiple Dwelling. 3. Hotel. 4. Private Club or Lodge, excluding
any which has as its chief activity a service customarily carried on as a
business. 5. Boarding or Lodging House. 6. Hospital or clinic. 7. An in-
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mandamus to compel the building commissioner to issue a permit
to erect a two-story building at the southwest corner of Linden
Boulevard and Sarah Street for an automobile display and sales-
room for cars and accessories. The permit had been refused on
the ground that the proposed building was for business and in-
dustrial purposes and therefore excluded by the zoning ordi-
nance. The zoning ordinance was held constitutional in its basic
aspects and general scope.
But the respondent contended further that the ordinance was
arbitrary and unreasonable in that it attempted to exclude the
proposed building from a district where there were old buildings,
boarding houses, flats, apartments both large and small, as well
as hotels, schools, and lodge and club buildings which were large
and imposing structures; that in fact the district was a decayed
residential district. The court reasoned that if flats, apartments,
and hotels were to be excluded from residence districts4 3 then
the people who dwell in flats, apartments, and hotels should not
be subjected to the same conditions that obtain in commercial
or industrial districts. However, the expediency of excluding
commercial and industrial establishments from first and sec-
ondary residential districts was held to be a matter for the legis-
lative body to determine. Thus, the classification was properly
upheld.
Summarily, the foregoing decisions brought the law of zoning
in Missouri to this status: Zoning in its general scope is valid
as a reasonable exercise of the police power; even where the
legality of the zoning ordinance in its entirety may be debatable,
the courts will ordinarily uphold it; the applicability of the zon-
ing ordinance to particular parcels is for the courts to determine
in each instance.
stitution of an educational, philanthropic or eleemosynary nature. 8. Acces-
bory buildings, including private and storage garages when located on the
same lot less than thirty (30) feet from the front line, and not less than
five (5) feet from any side street line unless constructed as a part of the
main building; however, it shall be permitted to maintain and operate a
storage garage in the basement or on the ground floor of fireproof hotels
and apartments, which garage is to be operated and maintained for the use
of the guests or tenants residing within such hotel or apartment. * * * "
43. In Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac.
381, the court held that the zoning ordinance may exclude from a strictly
private residence district, apartment-or-multiple-dwelling-houses under the
police power. See also Wulfsohn v. Burden (1925) 241 N. Y. 288, 150 N. E.
120.
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Before examining the applications of ordinances to particular
uses, an inquiry into the legal basis of municipal zoning ordi-
nances is in order. In State ex rel. Kramer v. Schwartz" an
interim zoning ordinance of Jefferson City was held invalid be-
cause it failed to comply with the Enabling Act. The city
council had passed a preliminary ordinance which provided for
the appointment of a city planning and zoning commission to
frame a comprehensive zoning ordinance, and the mayor had
made the appointments. Relator applied for a permit to erect
a store building on this lot, and the city refused on the theory
that the parcel in question was zoned against commercial uses
under the interim ordinance. But the Enabling Act had required
that the zoning "commission shall make a preliminary report
and hold public hearings thereon before submitting its final re-
port, and such legislative body shall not hold its public hearings
or take action until it has received the final report of such com-
mission."' 6 The statute further enjoined that a zoning ordinance
should contain a provision providing for a board of adjustment.47
The interim zoning ordinance failed to comply with these statu-
tory requirements.'8
Zoning imposes restrictions on property, and for that reason
the legislature provided for public hearings before the enactment
of such ordinances. A board of adjustmentg was deemed neces-
44. (1935) 336 Mo. 932, 82 S. W. (2d) 63.
45. R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 7259-7270.
46. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 7264.
47. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 7265.
48. In Wippler v. Hohn (1937) 110 S. W. (2d) 409, the court held that
the amending ordinance was void because enacted by the legislative body(board of aldermen) without the notice and hearings required by the Enab-
ling Act.
49. The St. Louis Board of Adjustment seems to be typical of such
boards. Briefly, it is provided that in proper cases and within certain
limitations, it shall be the duty of the board: to hear and decide appeals
from the order and requirements made by the Building Commissioner; to
permit the reconstruction, within twelve months, of a building located in a
district restricted against its use, which building has been partially de-
stroyed by fire or other calamity; "to permit the extension of a use or
height and area district where the boundary line of the district divides a
lot in a single ownership at the time of the passage of the ordinance"; to
interpret the provisions of the ordinance in such a way as to carry out the
intent and purpose of the plan; to vary or modify the application of any
of the regulations and provisions of the ordinances where there are prac-
tical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the way of carrying out the
strict letter of the ordinance, provided, however, that every such variation
or modification shall be reported immediately to the Board of Aldermen and
embodied in an ordinance by way of an amendment to the zoning ordinance
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sary to the proper interpretation, enforcement, or modification
of the zoning laws. With respect to the powers of a board of
adjustment the Supreme Court of Missouri in State ex rel. Nigro
v. Kansas City said:
The board of zoning appeals is intrusted with the duty of
enforcing the provisions of the ordinance; it is an admin-
istrative body, without a vestige of legislative power. It can-
not, therefore, modify, amend, or repeal what the ordinance
itself designates as its "general rules and regulations"; the
power to do that is conferred upon the common council of
Kansas City, and it can delegate no part of that power. * * *
It [the ordinance] does permit and direct the board to mod-
ify or partially suspend a rule in its application to a particu-
lar case where strict enforcement would * * * constitute a
practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship.50
Thus, it is clear that the board of adjustment has no legislative
authority whatever, its powers being confined to the narrow com-
pass fixed by the statute.51
The procedure provided in the ordinance in State ex rel. Seattle
Title Trust Company v. Roberge52 permitted the erection of a
philanthropic home for children or old people in the residential
district, provided the written consent of owners of two-thirds of
the property within four hundred feet of the proposed building
was procured. This latter proviso was held to violate the due
process clause, being an unwarranted delegation of power to
other property owners in that they could arbitrarily, without any
standard or rule, prevent the use for the purposes intended.
There was no provision for review, and the failure of the owners
to give their consent was final. However, the mere passage of
the permissive ordinance indicated that the establishment of the
proposed building was in harmony with the public interest.
before the same shall become effective. The Board's orders and requirements
are also subject to review by the circuit court upon petition. St. Louis Code
(1928) sec. 168. And see Enabling Act, R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 7265.
50. (1930) 325 Mo. 95, 100, 27 S. W. (2d) 1030, 1032. The Kansas City
ordinance designates the board as the zoning board of appeals instead of
the board of adjustment, as provided in the Enabling Act. In New York,
the board is known as the board of standards and appeals. Levy v. Board
of Standards and Appeals (1935) 267 N. Y. 347, 196 N. E. 284 holds that
said board has no legislative powers.
51. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 7265.
52. (1929) 278 U. S. 116. The building here was formerly a residence
and would accommodate fourteen persons. The trustees proposed to remove
the old structure and place in its stead a $100,000.00 building of two and
one-half stories, large enough to house fifty persons.
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A similar situation was presented in Women's Kansas City St.
Andrew Society v. Kansas City5" where the city officials refused
to issue a permit to plaintiff to use its three-story, single family,
residential building, located in the residence zone, as an "Old
Ladies' Home." The Kansas City zoning ordinance divided the
use districts into seven.54 Class U-1 use included such as are
usually zoned in the residential classification, 51 but class U-7 use
was special and included aviation fields, amusement parks, phil-
anthropic or eleemosynary uses or institutions, hospitals or sani-
tariums, institutions for the care of the feeble-minded, ceme-
teries, and garbage disposal plants. Property then devoted to
class U-7 use was to continue, regardless of the use district in
which the use was located, but no territory had been set aside
for class U-7 use. The other'six use districts were set aside for
their respective uses, subject however to the power in the zoning
board of appeals to permit class U-7 special uses to be located
in any one of them under certain conditions.
After numerous skirmishes,56 the plaintiff brought suit in the
federal district court to enjoin the city from enforcing the ordi-
nance as against its use of the property as an "Old Ladies"
Home," and the bill was dismissed.5  The question before the
appellate court was whether or not the said seventeen room resi-
dence could be used as a philanthropic home. That court held
that thd restriction placed upon plaintiff's property was not es-
sential to the zoning plan, for other uses, as enumerated in class
U-7 use, might be put in any of the six classes or use districts.
53. (C. C. A. 8, 1932) 58 F. (2d) 593, 605.
54. Briefly stated the use districts were: U-1. Dwelling House. U-2.
Apartment House. U-3. Retail. U-4. Light Manufacturing. U-5. Industrial
U-6. Unrestricted. U-7. Special.
55. The first residence or class U-1 use included single family dwellings,
public owned parks, two-family dwellings, churches, schools, community
centers, private clubs, etc.
56. Upon denial of plaintiff's application by the zoning board of appeals,
it petitioned the circuit court, and again its application was denied. Having-
appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, it dismissed its appeal when the
Nigro case, discussed supra at note 50, was decided. There it was held that
the power of the board was limited to the recommendation of modifications
of the zoning ordinance to the legislative assembly. Next the plaintiff at-
tempted to have a re-zoning bill passed, but that attempt met with a protest
of more than ten percent of the property owners within the area involved.
See R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 7263. The amendment then failed to pass the
necessary three-fourths of the members of the city council. 58 F. (2d) at
596.
57. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 1071.
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To place a class U-7 use in the class U-1 use district was to follow
out the general plan embodied in the ordinance. Therefore, to
use the property in question for the "Old Ladies' Home" was to
follow consistently the ordinance unless the home would "seri-
ously injure the appropriate use of neighboring property." The
court repeated the ruling of the Ambler case 8 to the effect that
it would not declare a law unconstitutional when it was fairly
debatable as to whether or not the law was arbitrary and un-
reasonable. The development of the police power was then
pointed to by the court. Originally, the police power extended to,
"public health, safety, peace, and morals," but it now includes,
so it was said, "general welfare,"'59 "public convenience, ' '60 and
"general prosperity."61
As to whether or not the intended use would seriously injure.
the neighboring property, the court followed the case of Univer-
sity Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphans' Home,62 which held
that the police power was not broad enough to exclude the or-
phanage from the residence district. Such an enterprise was
readily distinguished from factories, business houses, shops, and
even apartment houses. While an orphanage may be less agree-
able to the community in some respects than a school or private
residence, and while some may object to old people, those cir-
cumstances do not constitute a basis for restricting the use of
one's property. As the Supreme Court of Texas has said:
Laws are not made to suit the acute sensibilities of such
persons. It is with common humanity-the average of the
people that police laws must-deal. A lawful and ordinary
use of property is not to be prohibited because repugnant
to the sentiments of a particular class.63
No essential difference was found between an orphanage in cot-
tages and an old ladies' home for twelve in a residential building
58. (1926) 272 U. S. 365, 388.
59. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. State ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs-(1906) 200 U. S. 561, 592-4; Bacon v. Walker (1907) 204 U. S. 311, 318.
60. Marrs v. Oxford (1929) 32 F. (2d) 134, 139.
61. State v. Wilson (1917) 101 Kan. 789, 794, 168 Pac. 679. Mr. Justice
Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. 104, 111, said: "It
may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all great
public needs."
62. (1927) 20 F. (2d) 743, 745.
63. Spann v. Dallas (1921) 111 Tex. 350, 235 S. W. 513, 516. The court
held that an ordinance excluding a grocery store from a residence district
did not come within the ban of the police power. The reasoning of the court
may not have been well applied in that case, but it dealt with fundamentals.
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long used as a residence. In both instances the buildings were
residential in character, and the use of both was to be residential.
'The particular use as an old ladies' home was shown not to come
within the ban of the police power; hence the zoning ordinance
in its application to plaintiff's property was "so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to be void."''
The general zoning ordinance in Nectow v. Cambridge was
concededly valid but the classification of plaintiff's property as
residential was held arbitrary and unreasonable under the police
power. To the east and south of the parcel of land in question,
the neighborhood was unrestricted, and industrial plants occu-
pied part of the area. Across the streets on the north and west,
the property was zoned as residential. The parcel was vacant,
although formerly occupied by a mansion. The court below af-
firmed findings of the master to the effect "that no practical use
,can be made of the land in question for residential purposes,"
and that the zoning of the parcel as residence property was not
a proper exercise of the police power. The court concluded that
a serious and highly injurious invasion was clearly established;
hence the action of the zoning authorities came within the ban
of the Fourteenth Amendment and was not sustainable. A simi-
lar case of invasion of private property was exhibited in Glencoe
Lime & Cement Co. v. St. Louis.," Property located near a rail-
Toad and used by the owner for a storage yard for sand, cinders,
and other building materials was zoned as residential. In hold-
ing the ordinance void as applied to plaintiff's property, the court
found no showing in the record that the use of the lot for the
contemplated purpose involved the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare. The classification was characterized as al-
most a complete invasion of plaintiff's property. This is another
instance where a zoning law, valid in its general scope, was held
invalid as applied to a particular parcel. It is another instance
vf the taking of property without compensation under the guise
64. (C. C. A. 8, 1932) 58 F. (2d) 593, 606.
65. (1928) 277 U. S. 183, 188-9.
66. (Mo. 1937) 108 S. W. (2d) 143, 146. Although the courts hold that
a zoning ordinance may, as applied to certain parcels of property, amount
to an invasion, they do not hold that such ordinance or resolution is an
encumbrance on property, for where properly applied it is an exercise of
the police power. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corp. (1920) 229
N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209.
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of an exercise of the police power.8 7 However, errors of classi-
fication in the zoning laws are not sufficient to condemn zoning
laws in general. It is not possible to avoid all errors in framing
statutes.
A Kansas City ordinance which limited the number of auto-
mobiles that might be kept in a building used for living or
sleeping quarters to three was sustained as a police regulation.8
The ordinance showed on its face, as all should show, that it
was a police regulation; but it was not apparent that the ordi-
nance, as applied to a particular parcel, was a proper exercise
of the police power. In fact, zoning regulations are supposed to
segregate residences from railroad tracks, et cetera. The burden
to show the unreasonableness of the regulation which rests on
the person asserting it was held not to be discharged here, how-
ever.
The boundary lines of the zones caused dissatisfaction among
property owners in American Wood Products Co. v. Minne-
apolis,6; where the city refused to permit factories to be built
in a district zoned for multiple-dwelling use. Near the appel-
lant's property was a zone in which factory use was permitted.
In holding the ordinance valid the court explicitly recognized
that the line of demarcation between property to, be used for
industrial purposes is necessarily in any case somewhat arbi-
trary. A careful reading of all the facts softens somewhat any
apparent harshness in the case. Perhaps better than drawing
such tenuous lines would be the practice of viewing the property
and of studying the application of the zones affected to the par-
ticular parcels in question.
The recent case of Geneva Investment Co. "v. St. Louisl0 is
67. Judge Kenyon, in Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Society v.
Kansas City (C. C. A. 8, 1932) 58 F. (2d) 593, 598, said: "Private prop-
erty cannot under the guise of the police power be subjected to an unreason-
able annoyance and arbitrary restriction of its use where public welfare
can in no way recover benefits by such restriction." The situation was
entirely different in Wippler v. Hohn (1938) 110 S. W. (2d) 409. There
the amending ordinance, permitting a change of defendant's property from
multiple dwelling to commercial use (as a garage), was held arbitrary and
unreasonable in that the operation of the garage caused loud noises, noxious
fumes and gases, and danger from fire and explosion, and in that the re-
classification was antagonistic to the public welfare.
68. Bellerive Investment Co. v. Kansas City (1929) 321 Mo. 969, 1
S. W. (2d) 628, 640.
69. (C. C. A. 8, 1929) 35 F. (2d) 657, 661.
70. (C. C. A. 8, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 83. To sustain this ruling the court
cited Marblehead Land Co. v. Los Angeles (C. C. A. 9, 1931) 47 F. (2d)
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.significant because an amendment of a general zoning ordinance
was involved. The appellant sought to retain the enforcement of
the amended ordinance which changed the classification of a cer-
tain area, including appellant's property, from commercial to
residential use. The trial court found that the amending ordi-
nance was enacted to carry into effect the purposes of the general
zoning ordinance and to correct an erroneous classification there-
in. The appellate court held that the passage of an amending
-ordinance was governed by the same legal requirements as the
original ordinance; that if the restrictions of the amending ordi-
nance could have been enacted as a part of the original ordinance,
then the amending ordinance was proper. Basically, the amend-
ing ordinance must be a reasonable exercise of the police power.
In Mueller v. C. Hoffmeister & Livery Company71 the defendant
company sought to extend its mortuary northwardly onto a thirty
loot parcel purchased for that purpose. The general zoning ordi-
nance classified the district as residential. The use of the de-
fendant's property as an undertaking establishment existing at
the time of the adoption of the ordinance and not conforming to
the provisions of the ordinance was permitted to remain, pro-
vided "no structural alterations were made, except those required
by law or ordinance." In order to effect the plan, an amending or
spot zoning ordinance changed the use of the thirty-foot parcel
from residential to commercial. Plaintiff, living adjacent to the
parcel on the north, sought to enjoin the extension of the mor-
tuary and to test the constitutionality of the amending ordinance.
The court pointed out that the enabling act contemplated the
same careful, serious, and intelligent consideration of an amend-
ment to a zoning ordinance as is required in the preparation and
enactment of an original ordinance on zoning. In holding the
ordinance arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore void, the
court relied on Wippler v. Hohn,72 where the amending ordinance
528, where the residential zone was amended to include property originally
excluded therefrom. Incidentally, the St. Louis ordinance provided that if
protest against changes was signed by the owners of ten per cent or more
of the property within a certain area, then such amendment should become
effective upon receiving a majority vote of the members of the Board of
Aldermen. That provision of the St. Louis ordinance was held void as
being in conflict with the Enabling Act, R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 7263, which
requires a favorable vote of three-fourths of all the members of the legisla-
tive body. 87 F. (2d) at 87.
71. (Mo. 1938) 121 S. W. (2d) 775.
72. (Mo. 1937) 110 S. W. (2d) 409.
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changed the classification of two lots from "multiple dwelling"
to "commercial" uses, and where the reclassification was made
under influences antagonistic to the general welfare "and solely
as a favor to defendant Hohn." In the Hoffmeister case, how-
ever, defendant, operating under a nonconforming use, sought
by amending ordinance to extend that use to an adjoining parcel.
In this respect the case differs from Wippler v. Hohn.
One of the most interesting and significant of recent cases is
Marrs v. Oxford.7 3 Plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of
a zoning ordinance which undertook to limit and regulate the
-drilling and operation of gas and oil wells within a part of the
corporate limits. This ordinance limited the drilling to one well
-to the block and provided that one-eighth of the proceeds of the
well were to be prorated among the surface owners of the block.
The ordinance was held valid as a police regulation in that it
prevented noises, obstructions in traffic, dangers from explosions,
and incidentally unsightly structures in the city.
It appears well settled that zoning ordinances may keep all
commercial activities from residential sections. An attempt to
deviate from that rule was made in Ryan v. Warrensburg." In
that case the plaintiff sought to maintain his barber shop in his
residence, located in a district zoned as residential. He contended
that a barber shop was not a nuisance per se, that his business
was located in a "sparsely settled neighborhood," and that there-
fore, the imposed restriction could have no relation to the police
power. On the location of uses the court pointed out emphatically
that the administrative officials could not select or locate a use
in a district which was prohibited by the ordinance, and that the
legislative body properly considered that a barber shop, which
may cause the spreading of disease, came well within the ban of
the police power. In holding the ordinance, as applied to plain-
tiff's property, constitutional, Judge Hyde, speaking for the court,
said:
It [the city] is merely acting to prevent the operation of
any business of any kind in a district it has zoned as resi-
dential only, and from which it has excluded all business
establishments. Its authority to do this is the zoning act,
73. (C. C. A. 8, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 134, 139, 140. The case is cited but
to suggest the problem, which has become acute in neighboring jurisdictions.
See Comment (1929) 15 ST. Louis LAW REvi w 104.
74. (Mo. 1938) 117 S. W. (2d) 303.
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and not the law of nuisance. It has such authority if a
valid statute grants it, and the law of nuisances has no more
to do with this question than would Einstein's theory of
Relativity 5
It has often been urged that matters of taste and beauty should
be a basis for the exercise of the police power. What two courts
have said on this subject seems noteworthy here. In Women's
Kansas City St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals argued:
Successive city councils might never agree to what the pub-
lic needs from an aesthetic standpoint, and this fact makes
the aesthetic standard entirely impractical as a standard for
use restriction upon property. The world would be at a con-
tinued seesaw if aesthetic considerations were to govern the
use of the police power.76
In Dowsey v. Kensington the New York Court of Appeals thus
summed up the current judicial attitude:
Public welfare is a concept which in recent years has been
widened to include many matters which in other times were
regarded as outside the limits of governmental concern. As
yet, at least, no judicial definition has been formulated which
is wide enough to include purely aesthetic considerationsY7
The courts almost unanimously agree that matters of taste and
aesthetics, being somewhat in the nature of a luxury, do not
justify the exercise of the police power to take private property
without compensation. It is necessity alone that justifies the
exercise of that power. It is the welfare of common humanity,
- that is, the average person, that justifies the exercise of the
police power. While aesthetic considerations alone do not author-
ize the employment of the police power, such considerations may
apply incidentally; i. e., if the law has a proper basis as a police
measure, there is no objection to the aesthetic benefits flowing
therefrom.
75. Id. at 307.
76. (1932) 58 F. (2d) 593, 603.
77. (1931) 257 N. Y. 221, 177 N. E. 427, 430. What may come to be
regarded as a signal case was handed down in 1935 by the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts, which upheld the protection of roadside edges and rural
scenery from defacement by billboards. General Outdoor Advertising Co.
v. Dep't of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N. E. 799. While not a zoning
case, the opinion is notable for its analysis of aesthetic considerations in
connection with billboard regulation. The case is indicative of the liberality
engendered by Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss2/3
LAW OF ZONING IN MISSOURI
The interest of society justifies restraints upon the use of prop-
erty just as it justifies restraints upon individual conduct. Since
the decision in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, practically all
cities of the United States have accordingly adopted zoning
laws.7 8 Although zoning has thus been approved in general, it
must be remembered that it is the use of property that gives it
its value, and that zoning laws restrict the use of property. If
those restrictions are reasonable, that is, based upon the use or
uses to which property is best adapted, then the application of
the law to a particular parcel would seem justified. The law, if
properly applied, as presumably it is in most instances, will
stabilize the use to preserve the value of the property. But if,
for example, industrial property is zoned as residential, the law
is arbitrary and unreasonable and takes property without due
process of law. The due process clauses of the Federal and state
constitutions stand ever ready to step in to adjust the improper
applications of the law.
A zoning law, if reasonable, is valid in its general scope as a
proper exercise of the police power. Yet while the restriction
may be valid basically, its application to particular parcels may
still be the subject of inquiry by the courts.
78. See Bassett, Zoning (1936) 47.
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